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UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
___________ 
 
No. 12-2476 
___________ 
 
ASSEM A. ABULKHAIR, 
             Appellant 
 
v. 
 
*PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, in his official capacity; 
GEORGE W. BUSH, President of the United States, individually; *ATTORNEY 
GENERAL UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, in his official capacity; MICHAEL 
MUKASEY, individually; *SECRETARY UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF 
HOMELAND SECURITY, in his official capacity; MICHAEL CHERTOFF, 
Individually; US CITIZENSHIP AND IMMIGRATION SERVICES; JOHN 
THOMPSON, individually and in his capacity as District Director, Newark Office, U.S. 
Citizenship & Immigration Services; EMILIO T. GONZALEZ, individually and in his 
capacity as Director U.S. Citizenship & Immigration Services; ROBERT S. MUELLER, 
III, individually and in his capacity as Director, Federal Bureau of Investigation; 
MICHAEL HAYDEN, Individually and in his capacity as Director, Central Intelligence 
Agency; THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 
    
*(Substituted pursuant to Fed. R. App. P. 43(c)(1)) 
____________________________________ 
 
On Appeal from the United States District Court 
for the District of New Jersey 
(D.C. Civil No. 2-11-cv-06616) 
District Judge:  Honorable Jose L. Linares 
____________________________________ 
 
Submitted for Possible Dismissal Due to a Jurisdictional Defect 
or Summary Action Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 27.4 and I.O.P. 10.6 
August 2, 2012 
Before: RENDELL, HARDIMAN and COWEN, Circuit Judges 
 
(Opinion filed:  August 30, 2012) 
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_________ 
 
OPINION 
_________ 
 
PER CURIAM 
 Assem A. Abulkhair, proceeding pro se and in forma pauperis, appeals from the 
District Court’s dismissal of his complaint pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii).  For 
the reasons that follow, we will summarily affirm. 
I. 
 Abulkhair alleged that numerous United States government officials “maliciously 
delayed and denied his citizenship” because of his Muslim faith.  (Dkt. No. 1, Count II ¶ 
1.)  He claimed that the ten-year delay in processing his application for naturalization 
stemmed from Defendants’ alleged policy of discrimination against Muslims.  
Abulkhair’s application was eventually granted.  (Id. ¶ 32.) 
 Abulkhair asserted claims under the Federal Tort Claims Act (“FTCA”), the 
Administrative Procedure Act (“APA”), and the First and Fifth Amendments.  After 
granting Abulkhair permission to proceed in forma pauperis, the District Court dismissed 
his complaint for failure to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, pursuant to 28 
U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii).  Abulkhair was given leave to amend his complaint within 
thirty days of the District Court’s May 14, 2012 order.1
II. 
  Rather than amending his 
complaint, Abulkhair filed a notice of appeal on May 18, 2012. 
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 Normally, an order that “dismisses a complaint without prejudice is neither final 
nor appealable” under 28 U.S.C. § 1291.  Borelli v. City of Reading, 532 F.2d 950, 951 
(3d Cir. 1976) (per curiam).  Such an order becomes final and appealable, though, if the 
plaintiff “declares his intention to stand on his complaint” instead of amending it.  Id. at 
952. 
 There is no “clear rule for determining when a party has elected to stand on his or 
her complaint.”  Hagan v. Rogers, 570 F.3d 146, 151 (3d Cir. 2009).  However, when the 
District Court has provided a set amount of time within which to amend, and the plaintiff 
fails to do so, we may conclude that the plaintiff elected to stand on his complaint. Batoff 
v. State Farm Ins. Co., 977 F.2d 848, 851 n.5 (3d Cir. 1992); see also Hagan, 570 F.3d at 
151 (concluding that plaintiffs stood on their complaints because they filed notices of 
appeal rather than amending within specified time period); Frederico v. Home Depot, 507 
F.3d 188, 193 (3d Cir. 2007) (same). 
 Instead of amending his complaint, Abulkhair filed a notice of appeal within the 
thirty-day window provided by the District Court.  Therefore, Abulkhair elected to stand 
on his complaint, and the order of the District Court is final and appealable.  We have 
jurisdiction over Abulkhair’s appeal. 
 Having determined that jurisdiction is proper, we may summarily affirm the 
decision of the District Court if no substantial question is presented on appeal.  3d Cir. 
LAR 27.4 and I.O.P. 10.6. 
                                                                                                                                                  
1 Abulkhair’s APA claim was dismissed with prejudice. 
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 A well-pleaded complaint “must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, 
to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’”  Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 
678 (2009) (citing Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)).  A complaint 
offering “labels and conclusions” or “a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of 
action” does not suffice.  Id.  (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555).  The plausibility 
standard requires “more than a sheer possibility” that a defendant is liable for the alleged 
misconduct.  Id.  “Determining whether a complaint states a plausible claim for relief will 
… be a context-specific task that requires the reviewing court to draw on its judicial 
experience and common sense.”  Id. at 679. 
 The District Court liberally construed Abulkhair’s complaint as asserting several 
causes of action and it dismissed all of them for failure to state a claim.  Mindful of the 
standards set forth in Iqbal, we will address each of them in turn. 
 1. Federal Tort Claims Act 
 Abulkhair claimed that Defendants maintained a policy of discrimination against 
Muslims and that, pursuant to the FTCA, they were liable for monetary damages for any 
alleged acts of  discrimination perpetrated under that policy.  (Dkt. No. 1, Count III ¶ 2.) 
 The FTCA “operates as a limited waiver” of the sovereign immunity of the United 
States and should be “strictly construed.”  White-Squire v. U.S. Postal Serv., 592 F.3d 
453, 456 (3d Cir. 2010) (citations omitted).  A plaintiff must exhaust all administrative 
remedies before bringing a claim under the FTCA.  Id. at 457 (quoting 28 U.S.C. § 
2675(a)).  This requirement “is jurisdictional and cannot be waived.”   Roma v. United 
States, 344 F.3d 352, 362 (3d Cir. 2003) (citation omitted). 
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 Abulkhair filed claims directly with United States Citizenship and Immigration 
Services (“USCIS”) and the Office of Chief Counsel (“OCG”).  (Dkt. No. 1, Count I ¶ 6.)  
Those agencies did not render a decision on his claims.  (Id.)  Because Abulkhair did not 
receive final denials from USCIS and the OCG, he failed to exhaust his administrative 
remedies prior to bringing his claims under the FTCA.  See Pinho v. Gonzales, 432 F.3d 
193, 200 (3d Cir. 2005) (“Finality requires exhaustion of administrative remedies.”); see 
also Roma, 344 F.3d at 362 (claim must be finally denied prior to filing suit).  That alone 
supports the District Court’s dismissal of those claims.2
 2. First Amendment Religious Discrimination Claim 
 
 Abulkhair alleged that Defendants adopted and implemented a policy of 
discriminating against Muslims, thereby violating his First Amendment rights.  The 
District Court construed this as a cause of action under Bivens v. Six Unknown Named 
Agents of Fed. Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388, 397 (1971).  Vicarious liability does 
not apply to Bivens suits, so a plaintiff must plead that “each Government-official 
defendant, through the official’s own individual actions, has violated the Constitution.”   
Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 676. 
 Abulkhair did not plead sufficient facts to support his claim that Defendants 
violated his constitutional rights under the First Amendment.  Though he detailed many 
administrative delays and snafus, there were no facts supporting a claim that any 
                                              
2 The District Court also considered whether the FTCA claim would be time-barred.  
(Dkt. No. 2, p. 7-8.)  Because we will summarily affirm the dismissal of the FTCA claim 
for failure to exhaust administrative remedies, we need not address that alternative basis 
for dismissal. 
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individual Defendant intentionally delayed the processing of his application as part of a 
policy of religious discrimination against Muslims.  For example, Abulkhair stated that 
“[t]he heinous … acts … committed by … Defendants represent clear demonstration … 
of the worst Discrimination Act against all Moslem Applicants,” yet provided no factual 
support for his statements.  (Dkt. No. 1, Count II ¶ 30.)  We need not accept this type of 
conclusory statement as true.  Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678-79.  Abulkhair must have pleaded 
that each Defendant had personal involvement in the alleged religious discrimination.  
See id. at 676 (“Where the claim is invidious discrimination in contravention of the First 
… Amendment[], … the plaintiff must plead … that the defendant acted with 
discriminatory purpose.”).  He failed to do so.  The District Court properly dismissed 
Abulkhair’s First Amendment claim. 
 3. Administrative Procedure Act Claim 
 Abulkhair also alleged that Defendants violated the APA by intentionally delaying 
his application for naturalization.  The APA provides relief where a government agency 
unlawfully withholds or unreasonably delays an action.  5 U.S.C. § 706(1).  However, the 
only relief available is declaratory or injunctive.  For example, the APA authorizes a 
court to compel the agency to take action on an individual’s application.  5 U.S.C. § 
551(11)(C).   A court has jurisdiction to review an agency’s action under the APA only if 
the agency action is final, adversely affects the party seeking review, and is non-
discretionary.  Pinho, 432 F.3d at 200. 
  In this case, the only available remedy under the APA would have been ordering 
USCIS to take action on Abulkhair’s application.  Since the application was already 
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granted, the APA claim was moot.3
 4. Fifth Amendment Equal Protection Claim 
  See Palamarachouk v. Chertoff, 568 F. Supp. 2d 
460, 466 (D. Del. 2008) (APA claim moot when agency action completed after complaint 
was filed). 
 Abulkhair claimed that Defendants intentionally delayed his application because 
he is a Muslim, thereby violating his right to equal protection under the Fifth 
Amendment.  Though the Fifth Amendment lacks an Equal Protection Clause, it contains 
“an equal protection guarantee” through its Due Process Clause and prohibits the United 
States from wrongfully discriminating between individuals or groups.   Abdul-Akbar v. 
McKelvie, 239 F.3d 307, 316 (3d Cir. 2001).  Equal protection claims brought under the 
Fifth Amendment are analyzed in the same manner as those brought under the Fourteenth 
Amendment.  Id. at 317.  If a statute substantially burdens a “fundamental right” or 
targets a “suspect class,” it must be reviewed under strict scrutiny.  Id. (citation omitted).  
On the other hand, if a statute does not substantially burden a fundamental right or target 
a suspect class, it is subject to rational basis review.  Id. 
 Abulkhair did not allege sufficient facts to state a Fifth Amendment equal 
protection claim that was plausible on its face.  Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678.  His complaint 
contained no factual basis for his assertions that he experienced different treatment than 
non-Muslim applicants.  However, the complaint included testimony given before 
                                              
3 The District Court properly dismissed this claim with prejudice because amendment 
was futile, while dismissing Abulkhair’s remaining claims without prejudice and granting 
him leave to amend. 
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Congress by the Director of USCIS indicating that all applicants were experiencing 
delays.  (Dkt. No. 1, Count II ¶ 2.)  Abulkhair’s conclusory statements that only Muslims 
experienced delays was not enough to state a claim under the Fifth Amendment.  See 
Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (complaint does not suffice “if it tenders 
‘naked assertion[s]’ devoid of ‘further factual enhancement’”) (citing Bell Atl. Corp. v. 
Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 557 (2007)). 
 There being no substantial question presented on appeal, we will summarily affirm 
the District Court’s order dismissing Abulkhair’s complaint. 
